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DEFENDING KOREMATSU?: REFLECTIONS ON
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
MARK TUSHNET*

INTRODUCTION

Writing in 1945 shortly after the end of World War II, Yale Law
School professor Eugene Rostow described recently decided cases
upholding the detention of Japanese American citizens as a "disaster."'
They deserved that description, Rostow believed, because "[t]he course
of action which we undertook was in no way required or justified by the
circumstances of the war." 2 For Rostow, "[t]he internment of the West
Coast Japanese is the worst blow our liberties have sustained in many
years. 3
Rostow's criticism of Korematsu v. United States4 has become the
common wisdom. Indeed, it has been generalized into an observation
about the typical response of the U.S. government to perceived national
security needs in wartime. The Latin phrase, inter arma silent leges,
which literally means that in times of war law is silent, has been
translated to mean that in wartime the U.S. government frequently
adopts policies that are simultaneously exaggerated responses to real
security threats and substantial restrictions on civil liberties. 5 As David
Cole has put it, "there is reason to think that as a general matter in times
of crisis, we will overestimate our security needs and discount the value
of liberty." 6 And, according to Justice William J. Brennan, "After each
perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully
realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown
*
University Law Center. I would like to thank members of the faculty of the University
of Wisconsin Law School, David Abraham, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Paul Brietzke,
Wayne Moore, Richard Pildes, Peter Schuck, and Louis Michael Seidman for their
comments on a draft of this Article, and Matthew Kilby for his invaluable research

assistance.
1.
489 (1945).
2.
3.
4.

Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 490.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).

See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL
5.
LIBERTIES INWARTIME 224 (1998).
David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955 (2002).
6.
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proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error when the next
crisis came along."
This Article examines that observation, using Korematsu as a
vehicle for refining the claim and, I think, reducing it to a more
defensible one.
Part I opens my discussion, providing some
qualifications to the broad claim about threats to civil liberties in
wartime. Part II then deals with Korematsu and other historical
examples of civil liberties in wartime. It identifies a pattern in those
examples and provides a sketch of a social theory that might account for
the pattern. Part III describes, in relatively optimistic terms, a process
of social learning in which past examples of what come to be understood
as incursions on civil liberties progressively reduce the scope of civil
liberties violations in wartime. Part IV raises jurisprudential questions
about the role of emergency powers in liberal constitutions. In the end,
I "defend" Korematsu in the perhaps ironic sense that Korematsu was
part of a process of social learning that both diminishes contemporary
threats to civil liberties in our present situation and reproduces a
framework of constitutionalism that ensures that such threats will be a
permanent part of the constitutional landscape.
I. SOME QUALIFICATIONS

The claim about exaggerated responses needs to be stated with
some precision. It consists of three assertions. First, officials typically
overreact to threats to national security, describing them to the public
and to themselves as more severe than those threats truly are. Second,
officials typically develop policy responses to threats to national security
that are not well designed to reduce the threats! And, third, one feature
of the bad policy design is that the policies typically threaten established
civil liberties. As Rostow put it, the government surely has "the power
7.
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudenceof Civil
Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11, 11 (1988), quoted in
Oren Gross, Cutting Down Trees: Law-Making Under the Shadow of Great Calamities,
in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 39, 40
(Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM].

8.

Stephen Schulhofer calls the policies that are subject to this concern bad

compromises.

STEPHEN

J.

SCHULHOFER,

THE

ENEMY

WITHIN:

INTELLIGENCE

GATHERING, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11,

at 3 (2002). It is important to emphasize that the second claim is independent of the
first. That is, the second claim is not simply that the policy responses are not well
designed to reduce exaggerated threats to national security, but that they are not well
designed to reduce the real threats. Often, the first claim obscures the second. After
all, how could a policy be well designed to address an exaggerated threat? Good design
necessarily requires accurate identification of the threat.
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to wage war successfully . . . [b]ut it is the power to wage war, not a

license to do unnecessary and dictatorialthings in the name of the war
power. "'

A. General Challenges to the Claim of ExaggeratedResponse
Judge Richard Posner's recent reaction to the claims about
exaggerated responses provides a useful point of entry to my discussion.
Judge Posner focuses on the first component of the claims, that officials
typically exaggerate risks. According to Judge Posner:
It will be argued that the lesson of history is that officials
habitually exaggerate dangers to the nation's security. But the
lesson of history is the opposite. It is because officials have
repeatedly and disastrously underestimated these dangers that
our history is as violent as it is. Consider such underestimated
dangers as that of secession, which led to the Civil War; of a
Japanese attack on the United States, which led to the disaster
at Pearl Harbor; of Soviet espionage in the 1940s, which
accelerated the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons
and emboldened Stalin to encourage North Korea's invasion of
South Korea; of the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba,
which precipitated the Cuban missile crisis; . . . of the Tet

Offensive of 1968; of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the
subsequent taking of American diplomats as hostages .... "
Judge Posner makes this observation in the context of a discussion
of civil liberties in wartime, and-in that context-it is a bit peculiar.
One might quibble with some of his historical claims," but the more
interesting point is that many of his examples are quite removed from
the question of domestic civil liberties in wartime. Perhaps U.S.
officials did underestimate the risk that the Soviet Union would install
missiles in Cuba or the risk that radical Islamists would overthrow the
Shah of Iran, but it is quite hard to identify domestic programs (or
investigations) that could have been undertaken to diminish the

Rostow, supra note 1, at 530 (emphasis added).
Richard A. Posner, The Truth About Our Liberties, RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY, Summer 2002, at 4, 5.
11.
It is not clear to me, for example, that anyone underestimated the risk that
President Lincoln's election would lead to secession (or the risk that secession would
lead to war).
9.
10.
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assertedly underestimated risks.'" In a sense, then, Judge Posner's
attempt to refute the common claim about threats to civil liberties in
wartime exemplifies the cast of mind that produces those threats.
A recent paper by Professors Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and Gary
King offers a different critique of the overall claim.' 3 Their analysis
focuses on the third component of the claim, that official reactions to
national security threats in wartime typically violate established notions
of civil liberties. Epstein and her colleagues provide a quantitative
analysis of Supreme Court cases dealing with civil rights and civil

liberties from 1941 to 1999, comparing the rate of government success
defending against such claims during times of war (as they define those
periods) and during other times. " Their results are striking: The

government's success rate during wartime is lower than its success rate
in peacetime.
They find a slight tendency in wartime for the
government to prevail more often in cases involving protest
demonstrations, internal security, and conscientious objection, but a
slight tendency for aliens to prevail more often. They also examine
whether the government prevails more often in what they call "salient"
cases, which they define as cases that receive front-page coverage in The

New York Times.

During wartime, "the Court supported the party

12.
As Jack Balkin puts it, "Our lack of preparedness for Pearl Harbor resulted
from failures of diplomatic and military intelligence overseas, not too many writs of
habeas corpus or an overindulgent constabulary. No one thinks that Miranda v. Arizona
caused the Tet Offensive or the Iranian revolution." Jack M. Balkin, The Truth About
Our Institutions, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall 2002, at 92, 94. Perhaps one could
argue that the U.S. government's limited response to the domestic anti-war movement
encouraged the North Vietnamese to launch the Tet Offensive, although it would be
helpful to have evidence from the North Vietnamese to that effect. But, I would add,
suppressing the anti-war movement to the point where the North Vietnamese might not
have been encouraged would have required quite large-scale government action of a sort
that would legitimately raise questions about infringements on civil liberties. Put
another way, I suggest that a government that accurately assessed the risks of an
offensive like the one that occurred, and believed that suppressing domestic dissent could
reduce those risks, would have had to engage in what would also have been regarded as
real intrusions on civil liberties. This is, I think, contrary to the point Judge Posner
wishes to make.
13.
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Gary King, During War is Law
"Silent"?: An Investigation of Supreme Court Decision Making in Times of Crisis (Oct.
11, 2002) (prepared for presentation at Georgetown University Law Center) (on file with
author). This paper is a work-in-progress, and Professor Epstein has informed me that
the authors have refined and qualified their analysis in light of critiques they have
received.
14.
The authors distinguish between times of war strictly defined, wartime and
periods of "major conflicts," and periods when there may still be what they call a "rally
effect," a surge in presidential popularity due to some international event. These
distinctions are unimportant for present purposes.
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alleging a violation in 60.4% . .. ; that figure for cases resolved in the

absence of a war is somewhat (though not significantly) lower,
56.3%. ""
These results clearly mean that one must temper the strongest
claims made about the silence of law during wartime. Yet, one can still
harbor doubts about the meaning of the statistics Epstein and her
colleagues analyze. 6 With a qualification to be noted, their analysis
treats every case as equally important as a test of the claim about the
silence of the law during wartime. So, "for example," they write,
"almost every account of judicial behavior during international
altercations points to Korematsu as an illustration of the crisis thesis in
action. Just the year before, however (and while the United States was
at war with Germany), in Taylor v. Mississippi the Court ruled in favor
of individuals convicted for making anti-war and -draft statements.""
An analysis that gives equal weight to Korematsu and Taylor seems to
rest on flawed assumptions. s Epstein and her colleagues seek to
address this concern by measuring government success rates in "salient"
cases. Here too their measure seems inadequate. Cases receive frontpage treatment in The New York Times for many reasons, not all of
which support the inference that such placement demonstrates that each
case on the front page is equally important. For example, it may have
been a slow news day, or the Times may have assumed that something
about the Supreme Court has to appear on the front page whenever the
Court acts,' 9 or the Times' editors may choose to place pro-civil liberties
decisions on the front page to demonstrate the nation's commitment to
15.
Epstein, Segal, & King, supra note 13, at 13.
16.
In addition to the questions raised in the text, one might note (1) that the
analysis offered by Epstein and her colleagues does not take account of the possibility
that the Court might deny review during wartime in cases raising truly troubling civil
liberties questions, then grant review in other cases raising the same questions and
decide them against the government after the war ends, and (2) that the category civil
liberties may be too broad to capture the critics' concerns, particularly because some
policies that raise the most acute concerns simply are not put in place during peacetime.
17.
Epstein, Segal, & King, supra note 13, at 7.
18.
Similarly, as Mark Graber points out in a forthcoming work, Epstein and
her colleagues count Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as a pro-civil
liberties decision rendered in wartime, which is accurate given their definitions. Yet, I
doubt that those who claim that wartime places civil liberties under stress have cases
"like" Griswold in mind when making that claim. Rather, their claim is that civil
liberties cases raising claims related to wartime conditions are less likely to succeed than
would similar claims made in peacetime. Obviously, identifying the class of "related
to" cases will be difficult, but some such effort seems necessary before one can use the
quantitative techniques favored by Epstein and her colleagues.
19.
That assumption might have been particularly strong when the Court
confined its decision days to Mondays, a practice it abandoned in the 1970s.
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civil liberties even in wartime or even precisely in order to combat those
who criticize the nation for ignoring civil liberties in wartime. Notably,
the last of these possibilities suggests that the causal chain runs in the
opposite direction from the one Epstein and her co-authors believe-not
from importance to appearing on the front page but rather from
appearing on the front page to (ideological) importance.
Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith, and Kim Lane Scheppele have
made a broader argument supporting the proposition that some civil
liberties might be advanced during wartime.2 Scheppele describes a
phenomenon she calls "aversive constitutionalism," in which a nation
develops its constitutional law by referring to examples of behavior in
other nations that is said to be inconsistent with the first nation's
constitutional values. 1 For the United States, the other nation of course
might well be one with which the United States is at war. So, for
example, the second round of wartime flag-salute cases can be
understood as the Supreme Court's defense of civil liberties on the
ground that coercing expression is something our Nazi adversaries did.22
Klinkner and Smith identify circumstances under which racial equality
has been advanced in the United States, and isolate wars of a certain
type as a precondition for essentially any such advance.23 In wars
against enemies with anti-egalitarian ideologies, political leaders can
justify domestic sacrifices by asserting that the war is one to advance
American values, including racial equality.
These arguments do not demonstrate that a qualified version of the
argument about law's silence in wartime is unfounded.24 Still, the
arguments are enough to caution us against asserting too strongly that
every civil liberty is deeply at risk during wartime.2
20.

PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE

(1999); Kim Lane Scheppele,
Aspirationaland Aversive Constitutionalism:The Casefor Studying Cross-Constitutional
RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA

Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003).

21.

Scheppele, supra note 20, at 300.

22.
23.

See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
KLINKNER & SMITH, supra note 20, at 3-4.

24.
In particular, advances in civil liberties in wartime may occur by expanding
"our" liberties while contracting "theirs," with an attendant opportunity-and risk-of
redefining who is the "we" and who is the "they" in the circumstances. For additional
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 89-90.
25.
A different response to the general claim is that law is-or at least should
be-as vocal during wartime as any other time. See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Supreme
Court, 2001 Term-Foreword, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 150-53 (2002) (arguing that "[tihere is always law
...according to which the state must act"). Despite an overall assessment that courts
have demonstrated "depressingly familiar shortcomings" in enforcing constitutional
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B. When Is Wartime?
Early statements by the Bush administration about the war on
terrorism were to the effect that the war was one of indefinite duration.
And, indeed, statements about the existence of a war on terrorism go
back quite a long way. President Ronald Reagan's First Inaugural
Address, delivered as the Iranian hostage crisis was ending, said that the
United States would use "the will and moral courage of free men and
women" as a "weapon" against "those who practice terrorism and prey
upon their neighbors." 6 The 1996 revision of the federal habeas corpus
statute goes by the acronym AEDPA; the last letters stand for "Effective
Death Penalty Act," while the first stands for "Antiterrorism.""
The already long duration of the "war on terrorism" suggests that
we ought not think of it as a war in the sense that World War II was a
war. It is, perhaps, more like a condition than a war-more like the war
on cancer, the war on poverty, or, most pertinently, the war on crime.
To say that law is silent during a more-or-less permanent condition is
quite different from saying that law is silent during wartime. Perhaps
more accurately, the law that speaks when we are in a condition like the
war on crime is simply different from the law that speaks when we think
we need not be especially concerned with crime.
Seeing the "war on terrorism" as a condition also helps us
understand why there is sometimes concern about the enforcement of
civil liberties during wartime. Wars place civil liberties under strain for
several reasons. Mobilizing for war requires a nation to displace its
other domestic priorities, with the effect that the people cannot get from
the government some of what they previously thought important. This
may generate a desire to end the war quickly, so that we can get on with
our business. That desire, in turn, may generate resentment at those
who are thought to be prolonging the war-the enemy in the first
instance, but domestic dissidents as well.

restrictions on the invocation and exercise of emergency powers, Venkat Iyer offers
"some notable examples of judicial controls succeeding in moderating the wilder
excesses of certain emergency regimes." VENKAT IYER, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THE
INDIAN EXPERIENCE 62, 63 (2000) (describing decisions by courts in Argentina, Brazil,
and South Africa).
26.
See President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), in

331 (1989).
27.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28,
40, and 42 U.S.C.).
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
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This dynamic may operate differently when the war is a condition,
and particularly in connection with the current "war on terrorism." The
Bush administration's official position is that one important means of
combating terrorism lies in the American people getting on with their
lives and ignoring as best we can the threat of terrorism brought home.
Because the "war on terrorism" does not require much sacrifice on an
on-going basis from any of us, the war may not generate the resentments
that place pressure on civil liberties. Further, at least so far, the "war
on terrorism" has generated little domestic dissent.2" A low level of
dissent might have two quite different consequences. A low level of
dissent might allow the nation's majority to ignore-or tolerate-the
dissidents, whose actions the majority could see as unimportant. Yet, a
low level of dissent might allow the nation's majority to find actions
taken against the dissidents to be entirely acceptable.
To the extent that the war on terrorism is a condition rather than a
more traditional war, it seems clear that the proper response for legal
analysis is to think through what the more-or-less permanent balance
between liberty and security should be." Put another way, war-ascondition is a normal state of affairs, not an emergency in which
extraordinary measures might be appropriate.3" And, the normal
constitutional rules ought to apply in normal conditions.
C. What Are Civil Liberties?
Addressing Congress in December 1862, President Abraham
Lincoln said, "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy
present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise
with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act
28.
The war in Iraq did generate substantial domestic dissent, but the war's
quick termination may make it difficult for supporters of the war on terrorism to
attribute later difficulties, if they occur, to domestic dissent.
29.
In this connection, it might be worth noting the possibility that the most
relevant retrospective evaluation of current policies might rest on the proposition that the
United States was engaged in a war on terrorism whereas in retrospect it will seem that
in fact the United States was experiencing a condition of terrorism. In Padilla ex rel.
Newman v. Bush, Judge Michael Mukasey's discussion of the possibility that indefinite
detention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant might become "moot" may perhaps
be understood as the Judge's recognition of the possibility that what is today perceived
as a war will later become perceived as a condition, although there are other reasons one
might have for thinking that a detention justified today might become unjustified in light
of later events. See 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), adhered to upon
reconsideration, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
30.
See Gross, supra note 7, at 44 ("[Tlhe governing paradigm is that of the
'normalcy-rule, emergency-exception.'").
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anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our
country.""' Lincoln elegantly put what has become a standard point
about legal and constitutional analysis: Circumstances alter cases. That
is, the constitutional doctrines developed in connection with commercial
advertising or even political speech in ordinary times may not be
appropriate in other circumstances.
The Supreme Court has recognized the point. Writing in the
context of an economic rather than a military crisis, Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone argued that constitutional law did not need to be displaced, but
only properly interpreted, to deal effectively with the crisis. As he put
it, "emergency does not create power, [but] emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power." 32 And, just as emergency may
create the occasion for the exercise of power, emergency may provide a
justification for actions that would, absent the emergency, be unjustified
intrusions on civil liberties. As Justice Holmes noted, "When a nation
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right." a" Holmes might be read as expressing a resigned
acceptance of the inevitable, but it is better to read him as asserting that
what counts as a violation of free speech in peacetime is just different
from what might count as a violation of free speech in wartime.34
And, this must be right. At the most abstract level, a nation's
commitment to principles of free expression persists undiminished no
matter what the circumstances. But, no one ever questions the abstract
commitment anyway: Governments that prosecute someone for dissident
speech never say that the prosecution is inconsistent with principles of
free expression, but say instead that the speech at issue is not protected
by those principles properly understood. The real question, then, is
whether the scope of the particular civil liberty at issue is properly
defined with reference to wartime conditions.
Here we can distinguish between two general approaches to the
definition of constitutional rights: a balancing approach and a categorical
approach. Plainly, wartime conditions are relevant when constitutional
rights are defined by balancing competing interests.
Balancing
approaches, though, raise in acute form the concern about law's silence
31.
President Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862),
in 5 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 518, 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
32.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
33.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
34.
For one thing, Holmes was himself a member of a court that was at the
very moment deciding whether the speech in question was constitutionally protected.
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in wartime. Judges no less than other government officials are
susceptible to the pressures of events. Justice Robert Jackson made
some astute observations about the war power that are applicable as well
to the definition of constitutional rights with reference to wartime
conditions:
[T]his vague, undefined and indefinable "war power"
usually is invoked in haste and excitement when calm
legislative consideration of constitutional limitation is difficult.
It is executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes
moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is interpreted by
judges under the influence of the same passions and
pressures."
Judges, one might fear, will undervalue some and overvalue other
elements in the balance, and so define constitutional rights in a way that,
on reflection, should be troubling.
Categorical approaches are designed to offset this tendency by
screening out of consideration the features of the circumstances that are
likely to induce misjudgment. And, under some conditions, they may
succeed in doing so, when the categorical rules address decision-makers
who might not appreciate the importance of considerations thought to be
peripheral to their more central tasks. Consider, for example, a
categorical rule against torture by police officers. Judges might think
that in the abstract they can imagine situations in which torture might be
a valuable investigative technique. Judges might think that they must
communicate rules effectively to police officers. They might also think
that any verbal formulation of the (limited) circumstances in which
torture might be acceptable is too likely to be misinterpreted in ways
that would lead the officers to engage in torture more often than they
should. The judges could then conclude that they should announce a
categorical rule against torture despite their awareness that such a rule
does not correspond to their own sense of what is acceptable.
Categorical approaches make the most sense, then, when judges are
designing rules for others to follow. Unfortunately, they do so in the
form of precedents, that is, in the form of rules that they themselves are
to follow. It takes a mind-set that is, I think, quite difficult to achieve
for a person to rule out of consideration for himself or herself in the
future something that the person today thinks plainly relevant to a
35.
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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decision. The difficulty in the context of defining constitutional rights in
wartime is obvious. The circumstances of war are something like an
elephant in the living room. Judges might agree that a categorical rule
is desirable, but say that the rules simply differ in wartime. That is,
they would take the category war as relevant to defining the applicable
rule, and screen out other considerations. Alternatively, the judges
might try to screen out the wartime circumstances in their formulation of
the rule. But, try as they might, judges are quite unlikely to be able to
ignore the elephant's presence. True, they might not explicitly mention
the elephant in defining the categorical rule they invoke, but one can
rightly be skeptical about any claim that the elephant played no part as
they thought about what the rule should be.
What this means, though, is that one will be hard-pressed to say, in
any voice other than an advocate's, that civil liberties are violated in
wartime. Judges will test government actions against the Constitution.
They may often find that the actions do not violate the Constitution,
either because the judges place the wartime circumstances in the balance
as they define constitutional rights or because they formulate categorical
rules that take the fact of war as relevant to triggering one or another
rule. It is not, then, that law is silent in wartime. Rather, it is that
sometimes it speaks in tones that advocates of particular positions do not
like. But, after all, how is that different from any other time?
II. KOREMATSU AND THE Ex ANTE PERSPECTIVE
This Part explores a pattern in our responses to government actions
taken in wartime, tries to explain that pattern, and previews a reasonably
optimistic account of a process of social learning that takes the
explanation seriously. The pattern is this: The government takes some
action that its officials-and, frequently, the courts-justify by invoking
national security. In retrospect, once the wartime emergency has
passed, the actions, and their endorsement by the courts, come to be
seen as unjustified in fact (that is, by the facts as they actually existed
when the actions were taken). The explanation is this: The actions are
taken under conditions of uncertainty, when the officials do not know
how the war is going to turn out, but they are evaluated retrospectively
in, as Justice Black put it, "calmer times," and often when the war has
been won.36 The glow of success reflects backwards and affects our
evaluations.37 The social learning is this: Knowing that government
36.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting);
see also Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.

37.

The fancy description of this is hindsight bias.

For an accessible
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officials in the past have in fact exaggerated threats to national security
or have taken actions that were ineffective with respect to the threats
that actually were present, we have become increasingly skeptical about
contemporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the
scope of proposed government responses to threats has decreased.

A. The Pattern and Explanation: Ex Ante Decision, Ex Post
Evaluation, and EX Ante Knowledge
As I have said, it is commonly asserted that wartime emergencies
elicit policy responses that in retrospect are seen as unjustified. I will
sketch the history that supports this assertion, making no claims that I
can provide a comprehensive view either of the episodes I discuss or the
entire sweep of U.S. history.38
The first period is the 1860s."
President Abraham Lincoln
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, obtaining congressional approval
only after the event. He directed that military courts operate in areas
threatened by Southern forces even though the civilian courts remained
open.' Sitting as a circuit judge, Chief Justice Roger Taney condemned
the suspension of the writ, 4' but the Supreme Court never ruled on the
constitutionality of Lincoln's action. In February 1864, while the Civil
War was still in progress, the Supreme Court denied that it had
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of military trials by the
statutory route the defendant chose,42 and then, in 1866, after the war
had ended, held that the military trials were unconstitutional.43 During
Reconstruction, the Supreme Court evaded challenges to the
discussion, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Political Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998).
38.
I am especially concerned that the common use of a few episodes might be
misleading, and that examination of every period in which the United States (whether the
government or the people) believed itself to be under significant external threat might
disclose a far more random set of responses than the common story identifies.
39.
Sometimes the story is told about the Civil War only, omitting
Reconstruction. I think that doing so may lead one to give a bit too much credit to the
Supreme Court, which was somewhat more receptive to challenges to executive actions
taken during the Civil War than it was to challenges to Reconstruction, even though civil
liberties concerns could have arisen in connection with both periods.

40.

The classic overview of Lincoln's actions from a constitutional perspective

is JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1963).

41.
42.
43.

Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wail.) 243, 251-52 (1863).
Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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constitutionality of military reconstruction," although its 1869 decision
in Texas v. White adopted a theory that simultaneously endorsed the
Republican Party position that secession was illegal and cast some doubt
on the legality of the Republican Party position on military
reconstruction.45
The historical judgment on these events is ambivalent. Critics of
Lincoln's actions make a strong case that Congress must authorize the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus before the President acts. And,
continued military occupation of a pacified domestic territory seems
inconsistent not only with federalism but with core constitutional
concerns about civilian self-government. Yet, in both instances the
practical imperatives of the circumstances, and the evident justness of
the Northern cause, seem to support the legality of the government's
actions."'
The second period typically referred to in discussions of civil
liberties in wartime is the period near the end of World War I and
extending into the early 1920s, when-for a time-the United States
provided support for anti-Soviet forces in the Russian Civil War. The
U.S. Attorney General and state prosecutors brought charges against a
large number of domestic radicals for seditious speech, essentially
speech critical of the nation's wartime positions,47 and the Attorney
General directed a round up of radical aliens, seeking their
deportation.48 The Supreme Court upheld the use of laws making
unlawful the criticism of government policy. The Court adopted the
famous "clear and present danger" test in Schenck v. United States," but
applied it relatively loosely, allowing juries to find a defendant guilty if
the defendant's speech had a natural tendency to induce listeners to
violate the laws being criticized. 0 The Court continued to apply loose

44.
See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Georgia v. Stanton,
73 U.S. (4 Wall.) 50 (1868); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
45.
74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869) (describing the nation as "an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States").
46.
The considerations that lead some to find the government's actions in the
1860s lawful are among those that must be taken into account in evaluating claims about
the necessity for constitutional emergency powers. See infra Part IV.
47.
For a study of the sedition prosecutions, see RICHARD POLENBERG,
FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987).

48.

On the Palmer Raids and the 1920s Red Scare, see ROBERT K. MURRAY,

RED SCARE: A STUDY OF NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920 (1955), and REGIN SCHMIDT,
RED SCARE: FBI AND THE ORIGINS OF ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 19191943 (2000).

49.
50.

249 U.S. at 52.
See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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First Amendment standards through the 1920s," but, as we will see,
later courts repudiated the Court's application of its First Amendment
standards.2
The Japanese internment cases are the central examples of civil
liberties violations during World War II, and for the moment I will
simply note the immediate adverse response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Korematsu,53 a response that has not changed since 1945.
During the hottest periods of the Cold War, the government
brought prosecutions against members of the Communist Party.
Government officials took various other adverse actions against
members of the Party, people associated with the Party, and people of a
general left-wing cast who were thought to be associated with the Party.
In 1951 the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of the Party's main
leaders.54 It endorsed the "clear and present danger" test, restating it in
a way seemingly more protective of expression. Chief Justice Vinson's
plurality opinion expressly asserted that the dissenting views expressed
by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the cases of the 1920s were the ones
later cases "inclined" toward.5"
Still, the Court did uphold the
convictions.
Later in the 1950s the Court invoked the heightened standard to
reverse convictions of the Party's second-line leaders,56 and developed
related constitutional rules that made it harder for the government to
impose sanctions on mere "fellow travelers."
Its most important
decision, for present purposes, allowed the government to convict a
person for associating with a group that had both legal and illegal goals
only if the government showed that the person was an "active" member
who specifically intended to carry out the group's illegal goals. 7 Again,
this restatement occurred in an opinion upholding a conviction. Still
later, in 1968, in the midst of anti-Vietnam war protests and aware of
the significance of its decision for potential prosecutions of antiwar
protestors, the Court further tightened the standard in Brandenburg v.

51.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925).
52.
I acknowledge, with some discomfort, that I am painting with a very broad
brush here, and that a more complete account would distinguish among the types of law
at issue in Schenck and Gitlow and would describe how a court might reasonably have
thought the problems different.
53.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
54.
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516-17.
55.
Id. at 507.
56.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957).
57.
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-29 (1961).
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Ohio,58 now allowing convictions only where advocacy of illegal action
"is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." 59
This quick survey indicates the pattern commonly attributed to the
civil liberties implications of government policies in wartime: The
government acts, the courts endorse or acquiesce, and-sooner or
later-society reaches a judgment that the action was unjustified and the
courts were mistaken. The retrospective critical view is a compound of
two other judgments: that the threat to which the actions were responses
was exaggerated, and that the responses were excessive in relation to the
exaggerated threats (obviously) and even to the real threats that existed.
So, for example, critics say that the Japanese internments were supposed
to limit the possibility that Japanese Americans would engage in
sabotage and espionage on the West Coast, but that there was a much
smaller risk of sabotage and espionage from that community than policymakers thought. Or, they might acknowledge that the threats to the
United States from Soviet espionage were substantial, but assert that
prosecuting members of the U.S. Communist Party was a badly
designed policy response to the threat of espionage, which would have
been countered better by devoting investigative and prosecutorial
resources instead to intensified scrutiny of people associated with
embassies and consulates.
The critical reactions to policies made in wartime circumstances
may be mistaken. The reason is that the reactions occur after the event,
but policy-makers must act before the event. Even more, the reactions
all have occurred after the United States succeeded in combating the
wartime enemy, and usually under circumstances where there is no
plausible case to be made that the actions in question-the Japanese
internment, for example-actually played a significant role in the United
States' success. The policy-makers were acting in real time, when they
did not know that the United States would win the war and, even more,
when they could not be sure of the size of the threats they were dealing
with or of the effectiveness of various strategies to respond to these
threats of uncertain size.
From the ex ante perspective of the policy-makers themselves, the
actions they take might be entirely rational and ought not be criticized in
retrospect. And, to the extent that we are concerned with developing a
law that will guide policy-makers, we should be careful not to constrain
them because of our hindsight wisdom-unless we are confident that the

58.
59.

395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id. at 447.
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constraints we put in place really do respond only to tendencies to
exaggerate uncertain threats or to develop ineffective policy responses to
real ones.
Developing appropriate responses to decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty may be less difficult than it might seem,
though. The reason is that there is another feature of the pattern that I
have not yet discussed. The ex ante defense of policy-makers assumes
that they are doing the best they can to respond in conditions of
uncertainty. The historical record rather strongly suggests that this
assumption is often incorrect. Examination of the decision-making
process in detail reveals quite often-perhaps almost always-that at the
time the policies were chosen at least some of the relevant decisionmakers knew, and more should have known, that the policies they were
adopting were either responses to exaggerated threats or likely to be
ineffective in countering the real threats.
The evidence is clearest in connection with the Japanese
internment.' There, General John L. DeWitt, the West Coast military
commander, was a racist who simply assumed, without evidence, that
Japanese Americans posed a threat of sabotage and espionage. General
DeWitt made his final recommendation in favor of internment on
February 14, 1942, more than three months after the attack on Pearl
Harbor. In support of his recommendation, General DeWitt wrote,
"The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing
and confirming indication that such action will be taken."' DeWitt's
inference of a threat from the absence of sabotage rested on his racist
assumption that "[t]he Japanese race is an enemy race," and that it was
wrong to assume "that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by
convention as he is, . . will not turn against this nation when the final
test of loyalty comes.""
Rostow points to another indication of General DeWitt's cast of
mind: General DeWitt's Final Report, prepared in 1943 and published a
year later, mentioned three episodes of shelling the western coast by
Japanese submarines.63 Two of the three episodes, though, occurred
after the removal of Japanese Americans from the West Coast and, as
60.
61.

The standard account is PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
JOHN L. DEWITT, U.S. ARMY WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND, FINAL
REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST, 1942, at 34 (1943), quoted in
Rostow, supra note 1, at 521. Here and elsewhere I rely on Rostow's article in the
service of the rhetorical goal of showing that information about the decision-maker's
state of mind was available roughly contemporaneously with the decisions themselves.
62.
Id., quoted in Rostow, supra note 1, at 520-21.
63.
Rostow, supra note 1, at 523.
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Rostow pointed out, "These were the only such items in the Final
Report which were not identified by date. ""
The story of the first Red Scare is a bit more complicated. There,
the problem was that the policy response should have been known to be
ineffective. The reason is bureaucratic. The Department of Justice
conducted the raids that rounded up aliens to be processed for
deportation. The immigration statutes in place at the time did authorize
deportation of aliens who believed in or advocated the violent overthrow
of the government, or who were members of organizations that did so.
But, the Department of Justice did not control the deportation process.
Rather, that was in the hands of the Department of Labor. Department
of Justice agents prepared affidavits supporting the arrest, detention, and
deportation of aliens, but the Secretary of Labor actually had to decide
whether the affidavits and other evidence were sufficient to justify
deportation. And, Acting Secretary of Labor Louis Post was much
more skeptical about the radical threat than were Department of Justice
officials.6"

Secretary Post believed that a person could be deported as a
member of an organization only if the person knew he was a member of
the organization.6
Further, he believed that many aliens were
"members" of Communist parties with unlawful aims only because
leaders of the Socialist Party assigned their names to the new
Communist parties when radicals split off from the Socialist Party.67
Post also insisted that the person know of the organization's illegal aims,
and enforced rules against relying on uncounseled confessions and
illegally seized evidence such as membership lists.6" Post's recalcitrance
provoked efforts to remove him from office, but in the end nothing
happened precisely because Post was able to show that the Department
of Justice actually had very little evidence to support its claims that the
aliens it sought to deport were dangerous radicals.69 I emphasize that
this is not entirely a story of a heroic decision-maker resisting wartime
hysteria, although the story does contain such elements. Rather, it is
also a story about the inevitable disconnect between one bureaucracy and
another-a predictable failure of coordination.
64.
Id. Rostow also noted that "[t]hose subsequently arrested as Japanese
agents were all white men." Id.
65.
LouIs F. POST, DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM OF NINETEEN-TWENTY:
PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF AN HISTORICAL OFFICIAL EXPERIENCE (1923).

66.
67.

Id. at 177.

68.
69.

Id. at 215-22.
Id. at 311-12.

Id. at 178-79.
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A stronger case can be made for the effectiveness of the actions
taken during the second Red Scare. The legal attacks on the Communist
Party undoubtedly reduced its organizational effectiveness, and-at least
during World War II-U.S. citizens affiliated with the Communist Party
did engage in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Disrupting the
Party might have impeded the Soviet Union's espionage efforts
somewhat. A complete analysis, though, would require one to examine
what might have been done with the resources devoted to undermining
the Communist Party had those resources been devoted directly to
investigations of espionage. One would have to know, as well, how
easy it would have been for the Soviets to develop spies not affiliated
with the Communist Party. I do not know of relevant studies of these
questions, although I should note my sense that the investigations of the
Communist Party probably were too extensive-consumed too many
resources-relative to the role the Party played in espionage, to the
availability of other channels of espionage, and to the possibility of
deploying the resources more effectively in investigations of espionage
directly.
B. Some General Observations:The Relevance of Bureaucracy and
Limits on Social Learning
The story of the first Red Scare suggests a complication with some
bearing on defending Korematsu. The decisions we are examining are
all taken by government bureaucracies, and an analysis of their
effectiveness must take that fact into account. Assume for the moment
that General DeWitt actually did believe that Japanese Americans posed
a threat of sabotage and espionage (concededly, a belief predicated on
racism). He did not act on his own. Rather, he presented his
assessment of the threat, and of the possible responses, to bureaucratic
superiors. Although General DeWitt's reasons for action may have
rested on racist assumptions, the decisions of the higher-ups, relying on
DeWitt, were not.
Now, consider the situation from General DeWitt's perspective.
He is the front-line decision-maker, whose actions must receive the
endorsement of bureaucratic superiors. Being on the front lines, he may
believe that he knows better than his superiors what the true risks are.
But, he might fear, were he to present accurate information about those
threats, his superiors would mistakenly think that they were small, or
that his proposed policy response was inappropriate. So, he presents
them with distorted information-knowingly distorted information-to
ensure that they will make accurate decisions.
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One aspect of the preceding account of decision-making in
uncertain conditions deserves particular note, as a prelude to the next
Part's discussion of social learning. At the time decisions are made,
decision-makers say to the public that the decisions are responses to
threats of uncertain size and scope. The decision-makers, or at least
some of them, may have information available that suggests rather
strongly that the policies being adopted are either ineffective or
exaggerated responses to the threats as the decision-makers themselves
understand them. But, that information is, understandably, available
only to the decision-makers (or, worse, only to some of them). The fact
that policies are developed in uncertain times on the basis of information
not fully available outside the decision-making bureaucracy may account
for the courts' initial acquiescence in the policies, and for the subsequent
critical reactions when the previously unavailable information becomes
available.
Another consequence of bureaucracy is perhaps so obvious that it
might be overlooked. Decision-makers rarely like to admit that they
made a mistake, particularly recently. In the present context, the
background of Ex parte Quirin is the most relevant example. In brief:
Several Nazi saboteurs landed on the Eastern Seaboard in 1942. One of
them immediately went to federal authorities, informing the federal
officials of the Germans' mission of sabotage. The officials did nothing
for a few days. Then they rounded up the saboteurs, heralding the
arrests with press releases touting the effectiveness of the FBI in finding
and capturing the saboteurs. Fearing that a public trial would expose the
FBI's claims for the nonsense they were, the Departments of the Army
and of Justice agreed to prosecute the saboteurs in military tribunals
convened for that purpose.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of tribunals in an
action that Justice Frankfurter, one of the leaders inside the Court for
validating the government's action, later called "not a happy
precedent. ""

The bureaucratic interest in avoiding disclosure of

mistakes suggests that the public should be particularly skeptical about
claims that government officials know that their actions are justified but
unfortunately, for good policy reasons, are unable to disclose the
foundation for such claims.

70.
317 U.S. 1 (1942). The best source on the Quirin case is David J.
Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (1996).
71.
Memorandum, Rosenberg v. United States, from Felix Frankfurter (June 4,
1953) (on file with the Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School), quoted in Danelski,
supra note 70, at 80.
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A final general observation also should occasion skepticism, this
time about the limits of social learning. The pattern I have described is
one that might be called fighting the last war.72 That is, the legal
world's retrospective evaluation of actions taken the last time around is
that those actions were unjustified. Judges and scholars develop
doctrines and approaches that preclude the repetition of the last
generation's mistakes. Unfortunately, each new threat generates new
policy responses, which are-almost by definition-not precluded by the
doctrines designed to make it impossible to adopt the policies used last
time. And yet, the next generation again concludes that the new policy
responses were mistaken. We learn from our mistakes to the extent that
we do not repeat precisely the same errors, but it seems that we do not
learn enough to keep us from making new and different mistakes."
C. Some Contemporary Examples
We can now consider some contemporary examples in light of the
patterns I have identified. The first involves the general pattern of
retrospective adjustment of our understanding of civil liberties. The
second involves the bureaucratic interest in keeping mistakes from the
public eye.
We know from the Communist Party cases that a person cannot be
convicted of an offense defined as membership in a proscribed
organization, unless the prosecution establishes that the person knew of
and agreed with the proscribed goals of that organization. The reason is
that people sometimes become members of organizations with mixed
goals, legal and illegal, because they agree with and hope to advance the
legal goals, and do not know of or seek to change the illegal ones, and
that making mere membership an offense would unduly limit the
exercise of those members' freedoms of speech and association. But,
knowing that we cannot make mere membership a crime, can we
nonetheless make paying dues a crime?

72.
As Geoffrey Stone puts it, "[O]ne might say that the Court learns just
enough to correct the mistakes of the past, but never quite enough to avoid the mistakes
of the present." ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 8 (Lee. C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
73.
For a similar observation, see David Cole, The New McCarthyism:
Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2003)
("While it has altered slightly the tactics of prevention to avoid literally repeating
history, in its basic approach the government today is replaying the mistakes of the past.
All we have learned from history is how to mask the repetition, not how to avoid the
mistakes.").
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Recent statutes suggest that we can, when they make it an offense
to give material support to an organization that has both legal and illegal
(terrorist) goals.74 In ordinary language, paying dues to an organization
with terrorist and non-terrorist goals does give the organization material
support. The statute on its face does not require the government to
show that the defendant paid the dues knowing that some of the funds
would be used to support the illegal goals, perhaps on the theory that,
money being fungible, even money paid with the strictest of intentions
that it be used for benign activities frees up money to be used for malign
ones. If the patterns I have described persist, then we can expect courts
to uphold convictions in the face of claims that the government failed to
show that the defendant shared the illegal goals. And, we can expect
that several years later, courts will begin to require such a demonstration
from the government.
Notably, and relevant to much of what follows, one reason for the
pattern is that prosecutors are likely to single out the easiest cases for
prosecution first, those in which the claim of lack of knowledge of
malign goals is quite implausible. But, sometimes-perhaps because of
litigation strategy, or because of mistakes in the prosecution-the trial
records will not show the defendant's state of mind or knowledge even
though it is clear enough what that state of mind was. From a court's
point of view, the easiest way to rectify the problem is to say that no
evidence of state of mind was really necessary: The government was
really trying only to catch true terrorists and those who really did
support them, and really did bring before the court such people; the only
problem is a small litigation error that the courts will feel inclined to
overlook. Then, as weaker cases come along, courts will begin to
realize that prosecutors have taken the statute too far, sweeping up
defendants who really were not terrorist supporters in any commonsense way. They then will impose a state-of-mind requirement on the
prosecution.
My second example is the government's imposition of secrecy in
deportation hearings involving "sensitive" detainees. 75 Defending the
closure of the hearings, the government argued that even the disclosure
of the names and addresses of the people whose cases were being heard
might provide information useful to terrorists. The argument is that
terrorists could examine the names of those the government located,
infer the behavior that brought the people to the government's attention
74.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
75.
For contrasting decisions on the constitutionality of the secret hearings, see
N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), and DetroitFree
Press v. Ashcrofl, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
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from those names and other information the terrorists could gather about
the people, and then adjust their own behavior to keep off the
government's radar screen. It is important to acknowledge that this
argument is not senseless and may even have substantial merit. But,
two points about the argument must also be noted.
First, the
government's position has the advantage, from a bureaucrat's point of
view, of making it difficult for the public to determine whether the
government's policy was a sensible response to a realistically evaluated
threat. Second, the argument rests on premises for which the evidence
cannot be made public by the terms of the argument itself.76 In short,
just as judges and ordinary citizens must-and probably do-trust
executive officials to make appropriate decisions about who to prosecute
under laws that could be construed broadly to threaten free expression,
so here citizens and judges must trust executive officials to have made
realistic evaluations of threats and to have developed sensible policy
responses to those threats.
The general point I wish to make here is that the process I have
sketched is one in which courts implicitly rely on the good faith of
executive officials-here, the officials' good faith effort to prosecute
only true terrorists and their supporters-as the unstated basis for
overlooking civil liberties problems with the legal positions the
executive officials have staked out. These two examples demonstrate
the role deference to executive judgment plays in the development of the
pattern that I have described. As we will see, deference plays an
equally important part in understanding the problem of emergency in
constitutional law, the subject of Part IV of this Article.
III. SOCIAL LEARNING: THE WHIG VERSION

The optimistic view of the pattern I have described is that it
demonstrates a valuable form of social learning.7 7 The threat to civil
76.
Richard Pildes pointed out an important distinction to me.
The
government's argument rests on two premises. (1) Terrorists have proven adept at using
public information as a basis for adapting their behavior to avoid detection. (2) The
aggregate information provided by public disclosure of the names and addresses of
subjects of deportation hearing is an example of the type of information covered by
premise (1). Clearly, the government could be required to present evidence supporting
the first premise, although I would think that, stated at an appropriately general level,
the premise is close enough to being obvious that it would need no proof in any
particular case. The problem lies in demonstrating the validity of the second premise,
and specifically in showing that the information at issue is "enough" like the public
information referred to in the evidence regarding the first premise.
77.
Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein offer a different version of the Whig
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liberties posed by government actions has diminished in successive
wartime emergencies.7
We ratchet down our reaction to what we
perceive to be a threat each time we observe what we think in retrospect
were exaggerated reactions to threats. 79 To take the obvious example,
nothing on the scale of the Japanese internment has yet been proposed
during the current situation. 0 And, no substantial policy of racial

profiling has been openly adopted, though expressed support for certain
forms of racial (or, more properly, nationality-based) profiling at
airports has increased."1
Precisely what, though, has been learned? Consider first the most
constitutionally problematic actions actually taken so far, the detentions
of two U.S. citizens because of their asserted connections with
terrorism. The Bush administration's position is an evolving one. At
first the administration claimed that it could detain U.S. citizens
indefinitely upon an assertion by executive officials that the citizens
account, attributing the different reactions to Ex parne Quirin and the Bush
administration's proposal for military tribunals to broad changes in the legal and popular
culture, including growth in general skepticism about government and growth in concern
for the rights of the accused. See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military
Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST.
COMMENT 261 (2002). This account is not inconsistent with the Whig story I offer, but
it is more limited along one dimension, focusing only on one policy rather than on all
policy responses to wartime emergencies, and more expansive along another, with its
attention to broad cultural changes rather than to the specifics of wartime emergencies.
See also Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104
W. VA. L. REV. 571 (2002) (noting the limited civil liberties problems with steps taken
in the five months after September 11).
78.
Other things might be learned from the pattern as well. For example,
Korematsu and similar cases might teach us that courts should treat military decisions
just as they treat decisions by other bureaucracies, giving no special deference to
military judgments. Or, we might learn that our retrospective attention to overestimated
threats of danger has obscured our attention to questions about whether policy responses
are appropriate even if the threat is properly evaluated.
79.
It is worth noting that one part of the process of social learning might be an
exaggerated contemporaneous response to present-day policies: Overstated claims that
present policies threaten deep incursions on civil liberties might help us learn, over time,
that the present policies were unsound, even if not quite as unsound as their present-day
critics contend.
80.
For testimony about the existence of social learning see FRANCIS BIDDLE,
IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 108 (1962) ("[Then-Attorney General Robert] Jackson could not
forget his experience in the last war ....

He remembered the Palmer raids in 1920

.... "), id. at 111 ("I was anxious to avoid the hasty and harmful state legislation which
had broken out like a rash when the United States entered the First World War.").
Biddle was Solicitor General and Attorney General during World War II.
81.
For reasons that appear below, I do not regard special screening of foreign
visitors born in certain countries as raising interesting questions of domestic civil
liberties. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
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were unlawful combatants or soldiers in an enemy army, and that such
assertions could not be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Later it claimed
that the assertions could be reviewed by a court, but only pursuant to an
extremely deferential standard, and subject to restrictions on the
dissemination of evidence to the detainees themselves. 2
The
administration's present position seems indistinguishable from the
position taken by the Roosevelt administration and endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Korematsu. But, as I noted at the outset of this
Article, Korematsu seems now to be regarded almost universally as
wrongly decided. Is it the case, then, that there is simply an illusion of
social learning?"3
Perhaps the social learning is real. The administration's positions
have developed, with the most extreme and problematic ones gradually
being replaced-to some extent-by less troubling ones. And, whatever
the administration has argued in court, by and large its actions have
been more restrained than would be authorized by the administration's
asserted legal theories.8 4 One reason for the administration's behavior is
that those most enthusiastic about expansive presidential power have
come to acknowledge the practical political reality that they must scale
back their actions, if not their claims. Social learning elsewhere in the
society appears to have produced a political dynamic that restrains the
administration.
An examination of other actions that have been described as threats
to civil liberties reveals another dimension of the question of social
learning.
These actions include detention of resident aliens for
suspected visa violations, nondisclosure of the names of those detained,
deportations when violations were found, and seemingly intrusive
invitations by federal agents to members of Arab American communities
to discuss what they knew about potential terrorist activities in their

82.
For a description of the administration's positions, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
83.
Peter J. Spiro, 9/11: Insinuating Constitutionaland InternationalNorms, in
THE MIGRATIONS OF THREAT: NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH (John

Tirman ed., forthcoming 2004), points out the important role Congress and public
opinion have played in the way social learning has affected policy responses to the
September 11 attacks. The concerns I raise in the paragraph accompanying this note
arise from legal positions asserted by the Bush administration, suggesting that the fullscale process of social learning has not yet taken hold with respect to the policies at
issue.
84.
Probably the best example of this restraint is the substantial reduction in the
scope of the authority claimed for military tribunals from the initial presidential order
authorizing them to the rules developed by the Department of Defense for their conduct.
And, of course, as of this writing no military tribunal has been convened anyway.
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communities." Putting aside the question of whether any of these
actions should be treated as threats to civil liberties, I would focus on
the fact that the threats have affected almost exclusively non-citizen
residents in the United States. Some, it turns out, had violated
immigration laws. These law-violators were subjected to deportation

when their violations, prior to September 11, would not have led to such
action-at least not immediately. The government simply changed its
previous policy of respectful consideration of a law-violator's personal
circumstances. While perhaps not the policy best suited to a humane
government, this does not seem to be a violation of civil liberties.
In some instances, the actions taken might be true violations of civil
liberties. But, again, they are violations of the rights of residents who
are not U.S. citizens. David Cole argues that such violations might

have spill-over effects on the rights of citizens."a That is, once we get
accustomed to these actions when taken against non-citizens, we will be
more comfortable about extending them to citizens.87 That may be true,
but the threat to citizens has not yet materialized, except, as I have
suggested, in connection with the detentions of citizens as members of
an enemy army. In Cole's words: "Measures initially targeted at noncitizens may well come back to haunt us all." 88 My claim about social
learning is that, while the possibility Cole identifies is a real one, its
magnitude is smaller than he suggests.

Cole uses the example of the 1920s Red Scare and its extension in
the McCarthy era to illustrate his claim.8 9

His thought is that

85.
For an overview of these actions, see Cole, supra note 6, at 959-77.
86.
See, e.g., id. at 959 ("[Wlhat we are willing to allow our government to do
to immigrants creates precedents for how it treats citizens.").
87.
See Gross, supra note 7, at 48-50 (illustrating how "[t]he longer ...
counter-terrorism laws ...[are] on the statute book, the greater is the likelihood that the
extraordinary powers made available to the government under them will infiltrate into
the ordinary, normal legal system"); cf.id. at 51 (describing various processes by which
"One Can Get Used to This").
88.
Cole, supra note 6, at 959 (emphasis added); see also JOHN E. FINN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW

54 (1991)

("Desperate measures have a way of enduring beyond the life of the situations that give
rise to them."), quoted in Gross, supra note 7, at 39; Gross, supra note 7, at 47 ("We
should ... be aware of the danger that exigencies may lead to a redefinition, over time,
of the boundaries of groups .... making certain members of the original 'non-terrorist'

group into outsiders against whom emergency powers may be 'properly' exercised."
(emphasis added)).
89.
See Cole, supra note 6, at 995-96. Cole's other example is the extension
of the Enemy Alien Act, adopted in 1798 (and still in effect, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24
(2000)), to the Japanese internment, and the extension of red-baiting from immigrants in
the 1920s to citizens in the McCarthy period. Id. at 990-91, 996. As I have suggested,
if the Japanese internment cases are a precedent for anything today, it is a precedent
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McCarthyism shows that we learned that rules applied at first against
non-citizens could then be applied to citizens. Similarly, the rules
applied today against non-citizens may be applied in the future to
citizens. But, one might describe the process of social learning
differently. After all, the McCarthy era involved not just the application
of rules proscribing various forms of expression, but the development of
constitutional doctrine constraining the application of those rules. So, it
might be that what we learned is this: Actions that seem constitutionally
permissible when taken against non-citizens will be treated as
constitutionally problematic when they are taken against citizens.'
The social learning process couples learning about exaggerated
reactions to perceived threats with a persistent creation of an Othertoday, the non-citizen-who is outside the scope of our concern.9
Perhaps, indeed, we are able to discern exaggerated reactions and learn
to reduce their reach, only because we are able to displace our concerns
on to that Other.92 The Whig version of social learning does identify a
real process in which government policy in response to emergencies has
a decreasingly small range, but a more pessimistic view would direct
our attention to the fact that the policy continues to focus on the Other.93
Whether any nation could avoid the creation of the Other in situations of
emergency, or, perhaps better, how we can restrict the most troubling
aspects of the creation of the Other, is probably the central issue in
thinking about civil liberties in wartime. The next Part of this Article
takes up one aspect, probably the most important, of this issue: the
constitutional regulation of emergency powers.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALIZING EMERGENCY POWERS

Questions about the appropriate degree of deference to executive
officials pervade the arguments about the relation between wartime
policies and civil liberties. In this final Part, I move to an even more

cautioning against imprudent actions.
90.
For a broader critique of Cole's work, see Robert M. Chesney, Civil

Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by Association Critique,
MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003) (book review).

91.

Cf. Gross, supra note 7, at 44-45 (describing the way in which "[t]he

contours of conflict are drawn around groups and communities rather than individuals").
92.
Cf. Audrey Macklin, Borderline Security, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM,
supra note 7, at 383, 398 (describing "the law's role in producing the alien within").
93.
Paul Brietzke suggested to me the mechanism by which social learning is
limited: The prior crisis is distinguished from the present one, using criteria that are
undeniably reasonable.
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abstract level and consider whether (or how) to regulate the exercise of
power in wartime.
My concern here arises from two propositions about constitutional
design and implementation.
First, constitution designers cannot
anticipate all the forms of emergency that will arise and elicit interest
among governing elites in expansive exercises of power,94 perhaps going
beyond the limits placed on power by the constitution designers. At
best, constitution designers will use the crises they have experienced to
develop some general criteria identifying crises, but even such modeling
will inevitably fall short. Second, under modern circumstances the
interest in exercising emergency powers will gravitate toward the
executive. What, if anything, can constitutional law contribute to
thinking about the executive's use of emergency powers? I suggest
three possible courses of action: do nothing and leave the regulation of
emergency powers to the initial constitution; place legal restraints-in
the constitution-on triggering emergency powers and on the powers
that can be used in emergencies; or do nothing and acknowledge that
executive officials will exercise extraconstitutional emergency powers.
All three courses have advantages and disadvantages, and, without
purporting to offer a comprehensive analysis, I will suggest that the
third course is on balance the best.95
A. Emergency Powers Within the Constitution
The first possibility is to take Justice Hughes's observation in
Blaisdell seriously. That is, we would take the original constitution as
the sole guide for determining whether the exercise of emergency
powers is permitted. But, Blaisdell itself illustrates the primary
difficulty with this course. The case involved a state law suspending the
obligation of debtors to pay their debts during a period of national
economic distress. As the dissenters in Blaisdell pointed out, this was
94.
In referring to interest among governing elites in exercising this sort of
power, I do not mean to suggest that the elites will be unified either on the
appropriateness of exercising emergency powers in any particular situation, or on the

choice of policies to pursue in that situation.

What matters for me is that some

significant members of the governing elites will press for the adoption of expansive
powers, in the face of a constitution that appears both to fail to anticipate the situation
these members of the elites say the nation faces, and to constrain the adoption of policies
in response to the perceived emergency.
95.
For a broader analysis reaching conclusions that I regard as generally
compatible with mine despite some indications otherwise, see Oren Gross, Chaos and
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J.
1011 (2003).
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precisely the kind of law to which the constitutional ban on state laws
impairing the obligation of contracts was directed. In writing the ban
the drafters had in mind Rhode Island statutes suspending the obligation
of debtors to repay their debts during a period of local (and, to a degree,
national) economic distress.96
The general point is clear. Constitution drafters anticipate some
emergencies, but they fail to anticipate all the ones future decisionmakers will believe they must deal with. Facing a constitution that
seems either to fail to authorize or, worse, even to prohibit actions
policy-makers deem necessary to respond to the perceived emergency,
decision-makers, including courts, will feel pressure to "interpret" the
constitution to allow the actions.
Perhaps there is nothing wrong with this sort of creative
interpretation. After all, as John Marshall said in one of his great
opinions, "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding," one that is "to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." 97

One might worry, though.

Recall the problem of

retrospective evaluation discussed earlier.
One aspect of such
evaluations might be that the perceived crisis was not as severe as it
seemed at the time. What is one to make of a decision upholding a
policy because it was a permissible response to a crisis? I think there
are two possibilities. The Whiggish one is that the exaggerated
perception of crisis will discredit the decision as a precedent. The
other, more worrisome, is that later policy-makers, including courts,
will say, "Well, the action taken then didn't violate the constitution even
though there wasn't such a severe threat to social order, so the action
under consideration today certainly won't violate the constitution
because we face a more severe threat, and the courts upheld the earlier
policy in the face of a less substantial one."98

96.
As Lino Graglia puts it, in Blaisdell "the Court missed its best, if not its
only, chance to hold unconstitutional a law that really was."
Lino A. Graglia,
ConstitutionalLaw: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 767, 772 (1998).
97.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819)
(emphases added).
98.
One might argue, for example, that Ex parte Quirin has come to function in
this way in contemporary discussions. Cf. Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless
Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm-Exception"
Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825, 1857 (2000) ("Whenever the boundaries between
normalcy and emergency become semitransparent, it is almost invariably the reality of

emergency that exerts more influence on its counterpart than vice versa."). But see
supra text accompanying notes 87-88 (discussing the actual size of the risk that

precedents from wartime will be extended to peacetime situations).
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There is a related concern. In addition to serving as a precedent for
later, arguably even more problematic decisions, a decision upholding
an action as within the powers of a government during an emergency
serves to legitimate the action.9 9 It may be a bad thing for a court to
validate actions undertaken out of a sense of necessity. 00
B. ConstrainingEmergency Powers by ConstitutionalizingThem
Constitution writers can acknowledge the fact that emergencies will
arise by attempting to anticipate them and regulate the responses

emergencies elicit. The U.S. Constitution, for example, contains a
provision on emergencies: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
"101
the public Safety may require it.

This identifies the occasions on

which the protection afforded by the writ of habeas corpus can be
suspended-rebellion or invasion-and provides a criterion for
determining when the writ can be suspended-public safety." By its
placement in Article I, dealing with congressional power, the
Suspension Clause strongly suggests that the power to suspend the writ

resides in Congress and not in the President alone.'0 3
99.

The classic discussion of this effect is

L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE
47-51, 56-86 (1960).
100. For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 115-17.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
102. Other constitutions provide a more extensive list of occasions and criteria,
and identify substantive constitutional protections that can be suspended during periods
of emergency. These provisions are sometimes described as following a "reference
CHARLES

AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY

model" for emergency powers. See, e.g.,

JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS INCRISIS:

21
(1994) (drawing the term from a report by Nicole Questiaux to the United Nations SubCommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities). My
view is that the Suspension Clause is all that is needed to protect substantive
constitutional rights against violation: Guaranteeing the existence of a remedy for
claimed constitutional violations is equivalent to guaranteeing substantive rights
themselves.
103. Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution is an example of a more
comprehensive emergency powers provision. It provided:
If public safety and order in the German Reich is materially disturbed
or endangered, the President of the Reich may take the necessary measures
to restore public safety and order . . . . To this end he may temporarily
suspend, in whole or in part, the fundamental rights [to inviolability of the
person, inviolability of domicile, secrecy of communication, freedom of
opinion and expression, and inviolability of property].
The President of the Reich must immediately inform the Reichstag of
all measures adopted by the authority of . . .this article. These measures
shall be revoked at the demand of the Reichstag.
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY
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The Suspension Clause provides an example as well of some
problems associated with seeking to constrain emergency powers by
addressing them in a constitution.'" 4 The primary difficulty is the
fundamental one, that constitution writers cannot anticipate all the
occasions on which governing elites will think that it is good policy to
invoke emergency powers, nor can they specify in detail all the criteria
regulating such invocations. °5 For example, was the attack on the
World Trade Center towers an "invasion" within the meaning of the
Suspension Clause? If so, is the threat of an invasion, in the form of
some similar attack, a ground for suspending the writ?
The fact that emergencies arise with unanticipated characteristics
means that such emergencies will place pressure on whatever
constitutional provisions there are."°6 If the attack on the World Trade
Center towers was not exactly an invasion of the sort the framers had in
mind, still, governing elites may think, it is enough like such an
invasion to mean that the Constitution permits suspension of the writ.
And, if that attack is enough like a (true) invasion, so the threat of
another attack might be enough like a (true) invasion, and so forth.'0 7
CONSTITUTION OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC art. 48 (German Information
York, trans.), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF EUROPE 112-13 (E.A.

Center, New
Goerner ed.,

1967).
104. Committing the decision to suspend the writ to Congress seems to deal with
the problem of aggressive assertions of executive authority in emergencies. But, the
commitment may be illusory. Perhaps the Constitution can be read, as Lincoln thought
it could, to authorize the President to suspend the writ as long as he seeks congressional
approval as speedily as possible thereafter. Even more, Presidents will almost always be
able to identify some statute that, they will say, authorizes them to suspend the writ. A
court might eventually find that the President's interpretation of the statutes is erroneous,
but in the meantime the writ will have been effectively suspended by action of the
President alone.
105. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 98, at 1827 ("The exception is comprised of
sudden, urgent, usually unforeseen events or situations that require immediate action,
often without time for prior reflection and consideration-i.e., without allowing for
preplanned responses.").
106. Alex Aleinikoff suggested to me the possibility of an unrestricted power to
derogate from constitutional protections. Such a power would not raise the difficulties I
describe here. There would be no need to stretch constitutional language to cover
unanticipated emergencies, because the power would be unrestricted as to the occasions
on which it can be invoked. And (perhaps), the possibility of inappropriate invocation
would be limited by the formulation of the power as one of derogation, that is, as a
power to override what remain permanent and fundamental constitutional norms, and
limited as well by the political costs associated with asserting a need to override
constitutional protections. I am skeptical about the possibility of constitution drafters
accepting an unrestricted power to derogate, because I believe they will find the very
idea of unrestricted power to be inconsistent with constitutionalism itself.
107.
If the threat of another attack similar to those of September 11 counts as an
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The general point is obvious: Constitutional provisions that purport
to regulate the invocation of emergency powers will be subject to
pressure on precisely those occasions when the provisions seem not to
address the situation facing policy-makers, which are also precisely the
occasions when restrictions on the invocation of emergency powers
would seem most important. Including emergency powers provisions in
a constitution might well be futile, because those powers will be
exercised no matter what the constitution says.
But, there is a further point. Governments operating after the
invocation of emergency powers provisions are sometimes called
08
regimes of exception."
That term properly recalls the proposition
stated by German legal theorist Carl Schmitt that the person who has the
power to invoke the exception is the true sovereign in a nation.' °9
Further, Schmitt argued that the (liberal) rule of law could not-either
conceptually or practically-limit a nation's response to perceived
emergencies. Schmitt initially distinguished between an absolute form
of emergency rule, in which the invocation and use of emergency
powers was completely unconstrained, and a rule-of-law form, in which
the law identified the occasions for invoking emergency power, the
criteria for doing so, and the precise types of action that emergency
power justifies." A year later Schmitt rejected this distinction, arguing
that only the first form of emergency power is available because
emergencies are situations in which a nation's very existence is
perceived to be at stake, and the rule of law cannot constrain a nation's
efforts to survive.
As I have emphasized, regimes of exception will arise; the only real
question is how to locate them in relation to the nation's constitution.
Or, put another way, was Schmitt right the first time or the second?
Consider one aspect of emergency powers under Schmitt's first view.
Constitutional provisions dealing with emergency powers place regimes
of exception within the constitutional order. Constitutional provisions
dealing with emergency powers provide a language of justification for
the invocation of emergency powers, even though the precise language
used in the constitution may be inapt for the occasions on which
emergency powers are invoked. The provisions provide executive
invasion, then why would not the threat of an attack from Iraq?
108.
See, e.g., BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF TYRANNY:

REGIMES OF

EXCEPTION IN SPANISH AMERICA (1993).

109.

CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT

(George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1988) (1922). Schmitt believed
that his theory justified the actions of the Nazi regime.
110. For a discussion of the change in Schmitt's views, see Gross, supra note
98, at 1840-41.
OF SOVEREIGNTY 1
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officials with a fig-leaf of legal justification for expansive use of sheer
power. What appears to be emergency power limited by the rule of law
is actually unlimited emergency power.'
Further, courts may well succumb to the understandable pressure to
rationalize the inevitable with the constitution; judges as members of the
governing elites will feel the need for emergency powers that other
members of those elites do,"' and judges as judges will feel some need

to make what seems necessary be lawful as well." 3 But, in explaining
why the current circumstances fit within constitutional provisions
designed for other circumstances (as in treating the attacks on the World
Trade Center or the threat from Iraq as an "Invasion"), judges may
make the exceptional the normal. As David Dyzenhaus has put the point

in a related context, "one cannot, as Carl Schmitt rightly argued,
confine the exception. If it is introduced into legal order and treated as
such, it will spread.""'
The temporary will be made permanent,
threatening civil liberties well beyond the period of the emergency."'
C. Emergency Powers Outside the Constitution

Dyzenhaus argues that judges can domesticate emergency powers
by subjecting their exercise to the ordinary requirements of the rule of
law. Other authors-taking the position Schmitt initially did-argue that
well-designed emergency powers provisions can avoid the difficulties
111. For a discussion of problems arising from the inclusion of emergency
powers in Latin American constitutions, see Gabriel L. Negretto & Jos6 Antonio Aguilar
Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt
and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1797, 1803-09
(2000). See also LOVEMAN, supra note 108, at 23 ("Generally, a regime of exception
...legitimizes the drastic measures adopted to meet natural or man-made threats to the
existing political and social order.").
112. Although perhaps fewer judges than executive officials will feel that need,
or perhaps judges will feel the need to a lesser extent.
113. As David Dyzenhaus puts it, "Judges are unwilling to say that their role as
guardians of the rule of law is either at an end or greatly reduced." David Dyzenhaus,
Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication of
National Security, AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. (forthcoming); see also IYER, supra note 25,
at 63 (referring to "an unfortunate tendency on the part of many judges to adopt an
attitude of relative passivity in times of political crises").
114. Dyzenhaus, supra note 113.
115. See David Dyzenhaus, The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency
Powers be Normalized?, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 21. Dyzenhaus
notes that the title of his chapter comes from a work written by two South Africans
dealing with emergency powers under apartheid. Id. at 23 (citing A.S. Mathews & R.C.
Albino, The Permanence of the Temporary-An Examination of the 90- and 180-Day
Detention Laws, 83 S. AFR. L.J. 16 (1966)).
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that have arisen with existing ones."'

As I see it, the difficulty with

these prescriptions is empirical rather than conceptual." 7 The U.S.
experience that I have sketched, even in the optimistic Whig version,
gives little reason to hope that judges will in fact limit emergency
powers in light of constitutional norms rather than interpret the
constitution to accommodate exercises of emergency powers."'
Dyzenhaus hints at another path. Decision-makers might treat
emergency powers as extraconstitutional, an understandable departure
from norms of legality. Justice Robert Jackson's opinion in Korematsu
suggests how courts could conceptualize emergency powers in this way.
Jackson wrote:

[l]f we cannot confine military expedients by the Constitution,
neither would I distort the Constitution to approve all that the
military may deem expedient.

[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that
will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than
the promulgation of the order itself. .

.

. [O]nce a judicial

opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show

that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all
time has validated . . . [a] principle [that] lies about like a

loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need....
116. See, e.g., Negretto & Aguilar Rivera, supra note 111, at 1809 (arguing
that "a poorly conceived institutional design was one of the major causes for the abuse
of emergency powers in Latin America").
117. To some extent my position rests in part on the proposition that
constitutional provisions-both substantive provisions and those dealing with emergency
powers-are sufficiently indeterminate that judges will be able to reconcile their urge to
rationalize the emergency and the constitution without feeling a strain on their
professional responsibility for enforcing the rule of law. For a discussion of the relation
between Carl Schmitt's commitment to a much stronger version of legal indeterminacy
and his position on emergency powers, see Gross, supra note 98, at 1830-31.
118. And even this way of putting the point presupposes a position on the
question of what the constitution "truly" means. See supra Part II.C. Dyzenhaus
writes:
The government introduces legislation that is inherent suspect from the
perspective of the rule of law, but avoids . . . provisions that seem in

flagrant violation of rule of law principles. The dirty work is done by those
charged with implementing the law and the government expects that judges
who hear challenges to the validity of particular acts will put aside their role
as guardians of the rule of law because in issue is the security of the state.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 113, at 29-30.
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The chief restraint upon those who command the
physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past,
must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their
contemporaries and to the more judgments of history." 9
Jackson does not quite make the point I extract from his opinion,
which is that it is better to have emergency powers exercised in an
extraconstitutional way, so that everyone understands that the actions are
extraordinary, than to have the actions rationalized away as consistent
with the Constitution and thereby normalized. 2 ° One might call this a
claim that the actions have an extraconstitutional validity, one that the
courts cannot endorse but that is consistent with the persistence of the
constitutional regime.' 2
Treating emergency powers as extraconstitutional has another
advantage.' 22 Decision-makers can then understand that they should
regret that they find themselves compelled to invoke emergency
powers.'2 3 Once the emergency has passed they should not only revert
119. 323 U.S. at 244-47 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
120. Doctrinally, we might want to say that the constitutionality of exercises of
emergency powers presents a political question. The canonical formulation in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), does not support that conclusion well. The Suspension
Clause seems to preclude a holding that determining when an emergency exists is
committed by the text to another branch, although perhaps a creative interpretation of
the Suspension Clause would allow the Court to find that it commits determination of
when an "Invasion" exists to the political branches. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that the constitutional provision giving the Senate the sole
power to try impeachments also gives the Senate the power to determine what
proceedings constitute a trial). In light of Powell v. McCormack, 486 U.S. 395 (1969),
it would seem easy to discover "judicially manageable standards" for determining
whether the nation was subject to an "Invasion" within the meaning of the Suspension
Clause. Perhaps one could shoehorn the question into the category of cases raising "the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question." Baker, 369 U.S. at 686. But, in the end, Jackson's instinct is one
that fits uneasily into any doctrinalized approach to the political questions idea. For a
discussion of the doctrinalization of the idea, see Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in
the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political
Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1203 (2002).
121.
I am indebted to Wayne Moore for the term "extraconstitutional validity."
Moore suggests as well that the first two approaches I described could be called
constitutionallegality and extra-legalconstitutional validity.
122. Of course it has the obvious disadvantage of providing no brakes within
law on the exercises of emergency power.
123. That is why I describe the invocation of emergency powers as an
understandable departure from legality rather than a justified one. A justified departure
from legality would not be regrettable.
Wayne Moore suggests that we might
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to the norms of legality that were suspended during the emergency, but
should do what they can to make reparation for the actions they took.' 24
Here too Lincoln should be our guide, for among his observations in his
Second Inaugural Address, delivered in anticipation of a successful
conclusion of the Civil War, was the injunction that we "strive on...
to bind up the nation's wounds."' 25
V. CONCLUSION

Have I truly "defended" Korematsu? In one sense, yes. I have
tried to explain how decision-makers faced with what they understood to
be a threat to the nation might engage in actions that in retrospective
seem quite unjustified. I have suggested that those actions should look
different, not only to those who evaluate them in the future, but to
ordinary citizens and judges at the time the actions are taken. Judges
should refrain from giving in to an understandable urge to make
exercises of emergency powers compatible with constitutional norms as
the judges articulate them, to avoid normalizing the exception. And
ordinary citizens should take a stance of watchful skepticism about
claims from executive officials that the actions the officials take are in
fact justified by, and sensible policy responses to, threats to national
security.' 26 This is particularly true when the officials assert that the
nature of the threat makes it impossible for them to disclose fully the
reasons for the actions they take. The officials may be right, which is
why ordinary citizens should not be flatly outraged by the actions,' 27 but
there is a good chance that they are wrong, which is why we should be
skeptical about their assertions and careful about accepting them.

distinguish between the decision-maker, who might not be in a position to regret making
the decisions they do, and others, such as Supreme Court justices, who might regret
being required to allow others to make extraconstitutional decisions.
124. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1989b to 1989b-9 (2000)), can then be
understood as an expression of the view developed here. See also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY § 3.15 (1995) (suggesting that
policies expressing regret are more easily adopted the longer the time-span between the
violation and the policies' adoption). Peter Schuck suggested to me another policy
response: an insistence on maintaining records and making them public on an accelerated
schedule, to shorten the time before social learning begins.
125.
President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 687 (D. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
126. I am aware of the significance of my using the term citizens here.
127. Except insofar as the process of social learning I described requires that
some citizens publicly characterize the actions as outrageous. See supra note 79.
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